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M.M. Voronovitsky 
 
The Agent-Based Model of the Closed Market of the One 
Commodity with Finite Automata as Participants of the 
Market 1 
 
The model of market of one commodity   , in which there is in each moment of time the same quantity of goods and 
the same quantity of money was formulated and researched in this paper. Each partner of the market in the one 
moment of time can be in one of three status: to be buyer, be seller and do not take part in trade in this moment of 
time. Partners of market change their statuses and prices, by using the personal information of each of them about 
trade in the previous moment of time only..  The nature of dynamics of the set of prices of participants was 
investigated analytically.. The central result of the investigation is the using some finite automata with two 
action(careful and risky) as a model of  a participant of market. The convergence of trajectory of our system to  
stationary set of states with average price of trade which is close to some constant when behavior of all agent is 
careful and  bounded hesitation of this trajectory when there are risky agents only. These facts are established by 
series of experiments with computer realization of the model.  in the cases when all agents can fulfil only one kind 
of action and when all agents are identical simple determinate automata with linear tactic with careful and risky 
actions.. Some cases of the herd behavior of participants were considered in this investigation. We investigate our 
agent based models first of all as models of trade, but it will be useful to note that these models are example of some 
complicated self-adjusting systems also. This work was fulfiled by me only.I certify that I have the 
right to deposit the contribution with MPRA 
 
.Keywords: mathematical model, closed market, one commodity market, dynamics of prices, trajectory, stationary 
set, steady state, rational choice. 
JEL Classification: c51, D01. 
1. Introduction 
There are markets where any partner can be buyer at the  one moment of times,  he 
can be seller in other moment and not take part in trade in the third moment. The 
stock markets are one example of these markets. Several logical connected chains 
of exchanges are directed to receiving of profit. The serious role of these markets 
in economic mechanism is a principal reason of interest to research of these 
markets. Most interest is the research of dynamics of  such system and description 
of neighborhood of equilibrium or steady states.  
Richard Topol's paper [3] the most likely  was a first research where model of 
financial market with one asset in which behavior of autonomous participants of 
market of assets was simulated by stochastic process had been considered. Each 
partner can be a seller or a buyer in dependence of his position on the market and 
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he is characterized in this moment of time by his own price (of selling or of 
purchase).  The interaction between partners   represents itself by trade. The author  
supposes that  the    two partners can meet each other and   they both are agree 
some  price of the trade. The analysis of model showed that some probability 
distribution at which the herd behavior is most likely, is a stationary for stochastic 
process which represents the dynamics of this model. 
The approach to researching of dynamics of market which bases on formal 
description algorithm of decision making by individual partner of market and 
description of mechanism of interacting of partners, with following studying of 
trajectory of the system, steady states and stationary sets of states is most 
promising by our opinion. This approach is in frames of the more common theory - 
theory agent based models, which is  represented in works V.L.Makarov 
,,A.R.Baxtizin and Alan Kirman  [4],[5],[6].   
 The very interesting agent based model, which known as Santa Fe model of 
Artificial Sock Market model was created   by Blake Le Baron, W Brian Arthur 
and Richard Palmer [7]. But this model is very difficult for analytical research 
because algorithms of behavior and interaction of participants imitate the character 
of real behavior on the stock market too exactly, may be, but this model 
demonstrates of a dynamics of  the market which are connected with process of 
learning participants and  individual estimation of the  current market state  by 
agents. 
The perspective approach by our opinion consists in sequential research of  models 
the complexity of which is increasing sequentially may be when it begins from 
those which demonstrate  the principal features of market mechanism . 
 The works of famous mathematicians Gelfand, Tsetlin and their coworkers [1],[2] 
in which they  have investigated collective behavior of automata  is  source of our 
approach to studing of market models. Ideas of these works were used in the 
formulation and research of model of nonclosed market with one commodity 
where a market was considered as a system of interacting automata. Author was 
able to prove that trajectory of system reaches the neighborhood of steady  state of 
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system (equilibrium of demand and supply) from any initial state.[8].  It was not 
easy to create such model of closed market  which should   repel the   short-term 
and  realistic situation  on the stock market  .Nevertheless,  finally we could  
formulate the agent-based model of  the closed market with one commodity   i.e. 
model of market, in which  there  are the same quantity of commodity and the 
same quantity of money in each moment of time [9],[10]. Participant of the market 
can be seller, buyer or not take part in trade in each moment of time.  But in next 
moment of time each participant can change his status: i.e. a seller can become the 
buyer or the partner which is waiting(of the  moment to take part in trade with 
profit). There is the same situation for a buyer and for a waiting partner. Participant 
of trade change their status and declare new prices by using of his own information 
only . In each moment of time the buyer which has a money and agrees to pay the 
maximal price is trading with the seller which has a commodity and agrees to 
receive the minimal price . Moreover the prognosis of average price in the next 
moment sometimes stimulates sellers to change their status , i.e. to become buyers 
in the next moment or to refuse to take part in trade for several moments of time ( 
to be waiting).  The same take place for a buyer. The simple algorithm of changing 
by participant of his status (seller, buyer, waiting participant) in the next moment 
of time was formulated in the papers.  Moreover  algorithm of decision making 
about price and status in the next moment of time i.e. decision which participant 
make in the given moment of time includes in herself only logically justified 
actions at assumption of realization of prognosis of average price of exchange. In 
addition agent uses only information about result of trade  in previous moment and 
he use only the part of information about state of all market, namely   the average 
price of a commodity for the  previous moment of time. Different variants of 
simple algorithms could be considered: rational risky and irrational choice of 
prices and statuses. We have not considered exactly irrational choice in these 
stages of our research, but we considered a choice with the some risk and very 
careful choice. Some hypotheses about character of behavior of trajectory of 
system were confirmed in these investigations. We could receive some analytical 
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results about dynamics of set of prices of the model of market but we could not 
receive all analytical properties of stationary trajectory. The mathematical model 
was represented as a computer program and we have investigated by computer 
modeling some characteristics of simplest closed market. The main result of this 
research is the formal model of interaction of participants and mechanism of 
decision making by participants. In the last part of the research we studied by the 
computer model more complicated behavior of participants of market at choice of 
price.  
The first target of choice of the participant of market in our model consisted in the 
following: to sell a commodity by possible maximal price and to buy by possible 
minimal price. We consider the simplest automata as a participant of market with 
two actions, some memory and expedient behavior.  The goal of these automata is 
to receive maximal possible amount of many including the cost of his commodity 
if he is seller and to pay minimal possible amount of many if he is buyer. 
Herd behavior of participants of closed market is a very interesting phenomenon. 
We consider first of all two kinds of herding of participants: to go a bear and to go 
a bull. All sellers choice the careful actions and all buyers choice risky action in 
the first case (it induce the reduce of average price of market), and all sellers 
choice the risky actions and all buyers choice careful action in the second case ( it 
induce the increase of average price of market). We also considered herding in the 
case when all participants of market are finite automata. 
             The simple model of closed market with single commodity was formulated 
in the second section of the  paper. Each participant of market is characterized by 
quantities of commodity and money, by his price, by his status (seller, buyer, 
waiting agent) and by his relation to the risk. The last variable equals a unit when 
the given agent in this moment of time prefers the careful action and this variable 
equals minus unit when the given agent in this moment of time prefers the action 
which induces more risk. In addition if the agent is a seller  then his price means 
the price with which he agree to sell his commodity, but  if he is a buyer then his 
price means the price which he agree  to pay for commodity. At last if the agent 
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take no part in trade on this market (waiting), then his price is used as a orientation 
for change of a status i.e. he compares his price and prognosis of average market 
price and he make decision the following: to choose a status of seller or buyer or to 
remain waiting the situation which corresponds to one of such transformations. We 
suppose that each moment consists from two tact (steps of time). Also we suppose 
that each seller knows all prices, which buyers offer in this moment and each buyer 
knows all prices which sellers ask in this moment. Each seller offers all quantity of 
commodity which he has and each buyer is ready to pay all his money to buy 
commodity. Sellers, which ask the minimal price, sell their commodity to buyers 
which offer maximal price. The trade occurs by the price which equals the half-
sum of these prices (a seller and buyer have the equal forces in the bargaining) . 
One of two results is possible: sellers have sold all their commodity or buyers have 
spent all their money. In the first case buyers, which still have money after this 
trade, ask the commodity from sellers with the price with the next value(more than 
before). In the second case the sellers, which have commodity still after last step of 
trade, propose their commodity to buyers with the price with next value (less than 
before). The process is finished in two cases. The first when there is no price, 
offered by potential buyers, which is more than minimal price of sellers which still 
have commodity.  The second, when there is no price requested by potential seller, 
which is less than maximal price of buyers which still have money. Each 
participant of exchange receive own information about result of exchange after 
finish of exchange: quantity of sold commodity, quantity of money obtained for the 
commodity in the case of  seller and quantity of  the bought commodity and 
quantity of the money which spent for his purchase in the case of buyer. Occurring 
transactions as though are registered. The average price for all transactions for 
previous moment is communicated to all participants. For simplification of the 
model ( to reduce the effect of prognosis) also was supposed that average price of 
market  in the given moment is a orientation  for decision making of participants 
including waiting participants. Directly it is assumed  that participants think the 
average price in the next moment is close to average price of given moment of 
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time.  We use  this supposition with the alone goal to simplify the model on the 
initial stage of the investigation. On the second step of this moment of time each 
participant make decision about his status in the next moment of time and in 
accordance with it changes his price. He uses his own information and average 
price of market only in this decision making. The algorithm of choice is simplest 
and the choice is logically justified and it is coordinated with prognosis of average 
price of market. If the agent took part in trade in the first step this choice is 
fulfilled on the base of his own information about relation of average price of all 
his bargains and prognosis of the average price of market. If seller(buyer) sold only 
part of his commodity(money) or could not take part in the trade, in consequence 
of relation of prices, or hr was a waiting participant, then he defines his price in the 
next moment of time by using his price and prognosis of average price of the 
market( the same for all participants). The same process repeats in the next 
moment of time on base of results of trade in this moment of time.  
 The character of dynamics of the set of prices of participants was investigated in 
the third section. We name this set by spectrum of prices. It is proved that structure 
of spectrum of prices during the period starting with the some moment of time can 
be described adequately by several indexes of this set  The divergence of spectrum 
of prices i.e. difference between minimal price of buyers and maximal price of 
sellers, as well the width of spectrum of prices i.e. difference between maximal 
price of buyers and minimal price of sellers as well some other indexes of the set 
of prices of sellers, of buyers and of waiting agents are such several indexes which 
give to us adequate description of set of price of this system. It is proved that these 
indexes of the set of prices   become bounded by some values beginning with some 
moment of time. The width of spectrum of prices always will be bounded by some 
constant starting with some moment of time and divergence of spectrum of prices 
will be not less than zero.  
       The results of investigation of our system by series of experiments with 
computer model are stated in fourth section. We investigated the case when all 
participants are careful agents in the first part of section, after in we considered the 
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case when all participants are risky agents and case w hen part of participants are 
careful agents and other participants are risky agents. The central result of this 
section consists in the fact that after some moment of time     the average price of 
our market changes inside of the some interval. If we have calculated the value of 
this average price averaged on time  during the time from   until very large  time 
(more than  10000 moments) then this value of the average price  averaged on time   
will be inside this interval of prices. This interval is rather small in the case when 
the all participants use careful choice. But this interval is large in the opposite case 
when all participants are risky agents. The trajectories of average price of the 
market hesitated irregularly with large periods which were not constants in these 
cases. In the case when the one part of participants is risky agents and other 
participants are careful agents there was a intermediate situation. Interval was less 
than in the case of all risky participants and more than in the case of all careful 
participants. The same was in relation to periods of hesitations. In the fifth section 
we consider our agent based model of closed market as a  game of automata (see 
[1],[2]. We consider the participants which can choose between careful or risky 
establishment of their price in moment t+1, as a result of their success or not 
success and their actions before.  So our models presents some game. When we 
present the mechanism of a choice of price by agents as some finite automaton, we 
can follow to Gelfand and Tzetlin approach to investigation of games of automata.  
We modeled the participants of market as very simple determinate automata       
-asymptotically optimal automata with linear tactic and with two possible action 
and volume of memory m We research our system by computer experiments in this 
section. The assertion about convergence of trajectory of average market prices to 
some set nearly one value of price take place at our presuppositions only. We can 
see from many experiments the role of memory of our automaton also. We 
consider our model as one from possible models, which reflect some dynamic 
characteristics of stock market during of short periods of time when there is no 
perceptible changes in the environment. It is most probable that herd behavior of 
participant of market arise as a consequence of some changes in environment or 
externalities. Nevertheless in section sixth we discuss the question of several 
examples of collective behavior which similar herd behavior among participants of 
closed market. We have considered on the first step  the case when all participants 
of the market  used risky choice of prices only and we have found in this case that 
there is such stationary set in which the average prices of market are more than in 
the case when all participants uses careful choice of prices. But we can observe 
such situation in case of simple construction of market participant’s behavior. In 
the case of model of closed market with finite automata as a participant (we name 
it by L2m,2 ) we can see two interesting case of collective behavior similar  the  herd 
behavior. This sort of collective behavior we can consider as a game the first as go 
to a bear in one case and the second as go to bull in other case our paper could be 
represented in this model.  All sellers use only risky choice and all buyers use only 
careful choice when we see go to a bear and vice versa when we see go to bull. The 
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criterion for seller and for buyer to forget automaton behavior and to do the   
choice of prices (careful or risky) as a most of his partner was formulated in sixth 
section. .There is also criterion to refuse from herd behavior and to return to 
automaton’s behavior. Our computer examples have shown to us trajectories of 
average price of market in these cases. May be this model is most realistic among 
our models. We discuss our results and problem of modeling of closed market and 
say about possibility of further research of similar system in the conclusion. We 
would like to note that our result in just the same way modeling trade also concern 
the investigation of complicated self adjusting systems. This work was fulfiled by 
me only.I certify that I have the right to deposit the contribution with MPRA 
 
 
2. The model.   
 
We shall consider the dynamic model of closed market of one commodity with n 
interacting participants. Closure of the market means that in each moment of time 
the sum of money which all participants have is equal unit and also the sum of 
quantities of commodity which all participants have is equal unit also. The time is 
presupposed discrete: t=0,1,2,….  Participants of market are numbered by 
i:(i=1,2,3,...,.)  each participant of market has   one of three statuses that means that 
in each moment of time there is  the number  i(t), which can be 1,-1,0 . Each agent 
is able to have only one from three statuses i.e.         indicates that the agent is 
the seller in this moment,   i(t)=-1 indicates that the agent is the buyer and  i(t)= 0 
indicates that this agent takes no part in the trade in this moment. Each participant 
of the market can to have some quantity of commodity and some quantity of 
money simultaneously. It is   difference of this model from our model of nonclosed 
market which we have investigated many years ago. Let denote by   (t) the 
quantity of commodity which agent i has and denote by   (t) the quantity of money 
which agent i has in moment of time t.  The price   (t) also is characteristic of state 
of agent i in moment t. When this agent is a seller (         he shall not agree  
in this moment of time t to sell  his commodity by price which less that his price 
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     .   When this agent is a buyer           he shall not agree in this moment 
of time t to buy the commodity by price which more that his price      .  When 
        (agent is waiting) then the price of this agent has meaning of the 
indicator for choice of  one from three  possible decision of this agent in moment t: 
will become seller, will become buyer or to remain the waiting. When the 
participant of market is a waiting agent he can change his price depending on the 
relation of his price and average price of market in moment of time t which we 
denote by u(t). Moreover agent has one additional simple variable             
       which corresponds to agent i in moment of time t. If          then agent 
i varies his price more carefully than in the case            More exactly it 
will be defined below. So the state of our model of market in moment of time t is 
described by the 5N variables.  We shall suppose that each moment of time 
consists from  two steps (tact of time). During the first step takes place the 
following. Each seller (participant with           )   proposes to all buyers to buy 
all his commodities. Just the same way each buyer is ready to spend for purchase 
of the commodity all his money. 
a) Mechanism of interactions 
The exchange consists from bargains and consequences of these bargains are 
defined by relations of prices of sellers and prices of buyers. Let         at 
       ,          and let                   and also         at only 
     ,               and let                     ,   So the first bargain 
happens between  seller with minimal price and buyer with minimal price,  the 
price of their trade  equals half of sum of  two these prices:              
Let for definiteness the buyer with number   used up the all his money for buy of 
the part of quantity of commodity which the seller    has had, but some part of 
commodity remains at seller    after bargain . Then the seller with number    offers  
his remainder of commodity to buyer with number    and bargain between them 
happens  in just the same way as was described above. The bargain between them 
will be fulfilled by price (       )/2.  
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In the contrary case when after first bargain the seller    sold all his commodity but 
the some money remained at buyer      after first bargain then buyer     ask the 
commodity from seller    . Bargain between them will be fulfilled by price 
    +   )/2. Further it will be the next bargain depending on result of this second 
bargain. The next bargain will be between seller    and buyer     or between seller 
   and buyer    (similarly between buyer     and seller     , or between buyer    and 
seller       ). The quantity of commodity is decreased and quantity of money 
increased at sellers and quantity of money is decreased and quantity of commodity 
increased at buyer, when both take part in bargain.( the variables              (t)  
changing). Such process of sequential bargains will be continued as long as the at 
least will be fulfilled one from following three conditions. The first: all sellers have 
no commodity. The second: all buyers have no money. The third: the price of seller 
who still has a commodity is more than price of buyer who still has money. We 
have not considered until now the case when several sellers have in given moment 
of time the same prices and also the case   when several buyers have in given 
moment of time the same prices moreover both cases can happen simultaneously. 
In these cases the exchange   of commodity on  money  take place between one 
generalized seller with given price of a selling and one generalized buyer with 
given price of a purchase. After bargain the all money which the generalized seller 
has received (if he had sold all his commodity) or all commodity which had been 
bought by generalized buyer ( if he had spent all his moneys)  distribute  between 
all sellers with given price or between all buyers with given price. . We use in this 
investigation the following principle of distribution.  The sellers with the same 
price which have small quantity of commodity sold their entire commodity but 
other sellers with this price sold only part of their quantity of commodity. The 
same relate to buyers. That is reason of the result that these sellers  and buyers will 
have the different prices  in the next moment of time.  Let there are k sellers with 
the same  prices:              =    (t)=…_=             and different     
                                   (t).  quantities of commodity:. Denote:  
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    .  These sellers trade with buyer (may be also a generalized) 
who propose the price   (t) for commodity and has some quantity of money   (t).  
In this case not all sellers can to sell all their commodity and in this case there exist 
such and that.              (t))/2>  (t). The not all sellers can sell whole his 
commodity, but all buyers will spend his        
And the such        and H(t) exist that  in this case that:                 
                                                
                                                        
Thus    k-r sellers sell the all his commodity but the rest  sell only part of his 
commodity (moreover the same quantities). In the case of this principle of 
distribution the sellers which ask the same price are divided on two groups: sellers 
which sold all his commodity and sellers which sold only part of his commodity. 
Distribution of expenditures among buyers with the same price  happens 
analogously. 
      Quantity of commodity and quantity of money of agent i which took part in 
exchange  vary once end of the first tact  ( step of time) of moment of time t is 
reached and at        will be    (t+1)         (t+1)   (t) and at          
will be                 (t+1)      . If agent i is a seller  and he not took  part 
in trade because his price is rather high for buyers, then quantities of his 
commodity and of his money not change. If an agent i is a buyer  and he took not 
part in trade because his price is rather low for sellers, then quantities of his 
commodity and of his money not change also. If agent  is a waiting agent then it is 
obviously  that quantities of his commodity and of his money not change . We can 
define the average price of exchanges      in which  this seller or this buyer took 
part in the first tact(step of time) of moment of time t: 
  (t)=(  (t+1)-  (t))/(  (t)-  (t+1))   if         
  (t)=(  (t)-  (t+1))/(  (t+1)-  (t))   if          
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It is possible to define general variables of exchange in this tact and if any 
exchange happens then we can define average  price of trade of whole system at 
this moment of time. 
                
   
        (t)(           
 X(t)=    
   
         (t+1)  (t)(           
if turn out        to be then we set that: 
     
     
     
 
Where we shall name u(t) the average price of market in the moment of time t.. 
We shall suppose that center (operator) one for all market exists. All bargains at 
market register by this center.  He also calculates the average price and declares 
this average price all participants of market. The value of average price in moment 
of time t is single external information for participant of market. Other information 
of participant is the his own information (with index i). 
b) The establishment of the new statuses of participants of the market 
In the course of the second tact of moment of time t each participant of market 
changes his status and after it he determines his new prices. He do it by using the 
result of trade on the first tact of this moment of time. We are constrained to 
propose for the simplification of model that participant  can  use for establishment 
of  new status and new price  only information about result of his trade on the first 
tact of moment t and  the average price in moment t. Moreover  to make the 
algorithm of choice of statuses and prices the simplest  we suppose that 
participants are hoping  for that the average price of the market in moment t+1 will 
be the same that average price in moment t. 
Therefore we shall presuppose that agent i chooses his status in moment t+1  in the 
any situation (result of trade) after first step of moment of time t by means of the 
comparison of the  average price on the market u(t) with   average price of his 
bargains on the first tact of moment t (      )) . We shall presuppose for 
simplification of our model that careful agent and risky agent do it by 
independently from their character. But their characters ( careful or risky) will be 
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appear when they will know their statuses already and they will be defining their 
new prices after it.  We proposed the following (rather simple ) algorithm for this 
choice of new statuses. From the beginning we shall consider the logic of seller's  
decision making about changing of status (       ) . If in the first tact of 
moment t the seller has sold all quantity of commodity which he has had   then in 
moment t+1 he can become buyer or waiting agent only (he has no commodity) . It 
is profitable for him to become the buyer if he can hope  to buy the commodity in 
next moment (t+1) more cheaply than he has sold his commodity in moment t. We 
can propose at the condition of his limited information that agent makes decision in 
accordance to the following algorithm. If             he will become the buyer  
(        ). In other case (          ) he will became waiting agent (      
 ). If in the first tact of moment t the seller i (  (t)=1)sold only part of his 
commodity or not took part in trade(         ) then there is one reason of it. 
This reason is his price (     ) which is rather high for all buyers in this moment. If 
he has commodity and has money (                   ) then he can 
choose to become a buyer (          ) or a seller(         ) in the next 
moment. Let in this case he    can hope to buy the commodity by the price which is 
less than the price which he asked in moment t (   (t)>u(t)). 
 If in this case he has money (         ) then he becomes the buyer (     
1=−1), if has no money (yit+1=0) he must wait the appropriate situation and 
becomes  the waiting agent(         ). If (          ) then there has sense 
for seller i(       ) to remain the seller(         ). 
Now we shall consider case when our agent in moment t is a buyer (  (t)=-1). 
 If in the first tact of moment t the buyer has spent all his money which he has had 
(          )  then in moment t+1 he can became seller (         )or 
waiting agent(         ) only. It is profitable for him to become the seller if 
he can hope  to sell the commodity in next moment (t+1) more expensively than he 
has bought the commodity in moment t (          ). We can propose that  he 
make the decision in accordance to the following algorithm. If            he 
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will become the seller(         ). In other case (  (t)     ) he will become 
waiting agent (          ) . 
If in the first tact of moment t the buyer spent only part of his money or not took 
part in trade (          ) then there is one reason of it. This reason is his 
price(     ) which is rather low for all sellers in this moment(t). If he has 
commodity and has money (                   ) then he can choose to 
become a seller(          ) or a buyer(          )in the next 
moment(t+1). If              then he can hope to sell the commodity in the 
moment t+1 by the price which is more  than the price which he asked in moment t 
(      ). If in this case he has commodity (         ) then he becomes the 
seller (         ) . In the opposite case (         ) he must wait the 
appropriate situation and becomes  the waiting agent (         ). If       
     then there has sense to remain the buyer    
 
        .  
Finally we shall consider the case when the our agent is a waiting agent in the 
moment t(       ). For such agent the variables which determine his decision 
are the quantities of commodity and money which he has, his price, his relation to 
risk in this moment and average price of market in moment t  ( 
                              ). If             b then   has sense for this agent to 
become the buyer (           ) .  If he has money for this        
           a he become the buyer. If he has no money then he remains the 
waiting agent in next moment of time (         ). If             then has 
sense for this agent to become the seller.  If he has commodity for this         
         )  he become the seller(         ). If he has no commodity then 
he remains the waiting agent (         )  in next moment of time (t+1).  
         The definition of new statuses of participant is not the end of the second tact 
of moment of time t. Participants after it establish their new prices in next moment 
of time (  (t+1))). We shall suppose (to simplify the model) that participant can 
decrease his price or can increase his price on the value d only. d is the same in all 
moments of time and it is a parameter of model. Now we shall describe simple 
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rules of changing of prices related to following two kinds of participants: a careful 
agent in moment t  (  (t+1)=1) and  a risky agent in this moment of time  (     
     ). The difference between careful and risky agent consists in the 
following. When  agent wants to sell then  if this agent is risky  agent then he   tries 
to ask  the price which is more on value d of   the price  which  careful agent 
should define in this case  (if it possible). When agent wants to buy then if this 
agent is risky agent then he tries to propose the price which is less on the value d of   
the price which careful agent should define in this case. We shall describe the 
algorithm of changing of prices below.   If a seller have sold all his 
commodity(           or a buyer have spent  all his money  (  (t+1)=0) in the 
first tact of the moment  t  then he can  use  average price of all his bargains( 
       at  the definition of a price in next moment (t+1). This average price 
(        of agent is more of his price in moment t        , if  he was s seller and 
(     ) it is less of his price in moment t (       if he was buyer. If in this situation  
the participant was a seller (        ) in moment t and became a 
buyer(  (t+1)=-1) in moment t+1, then the careful agent t chooses the new price 
which equal his average price in moment r (               but a risky agent 
chooses  the price which is  less  of  average price  of agent in this moment  on 
value d (                ), if it possible. If it not possible he does as careful 
agent (              ). If in this situation the participant was a buyer (  (t)=-
1) in moment t and became a seller (  (t+1)=1) in moment t+1 then he do the same  
                    but in case of risky agent he defines the price which  more  
of average price of agent on value d(                ), if it possible. 
 Let consider once more the situation in which a seller has sold all his commodity 
or  in this situation a buyer has spent  all his money in the first tact of the moment  
t. If some participant was a seller (  (t)=1) in moment t and became a waiting 
agent in moment t+1(  (t+1)=0), then the careful agent t chooses the new price 
which equal his average price in moment r                 but a risky agent 
chooses  the price which is less of his average price in this moment  on value d 
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(                  . If in this situation the participant was a buyer (  (t)=1) 
in moment t and became a waiting agent (  (t+1)=0)in moment t+1 then he do the 
same but in case of risky agent he defines the price which  more  of average price 
on value d (                ).  
Now we shall consider the remaining possibility. This will be when seller have 
sold in the first tact of moment t only part of his commodity or he at all not took  
part in exchange (          ) or when buyer have spent in the first tact of 
moment t only part of his money or he at all not took part in exchange(      
1>0).  In this case participant can be guided by his price in moment t (  (t)) and be 
guided by the result of his exchange(           (t+1))or absence it in first tact of 
moment t.  If in this case the agent which was a seller in moment t (            
becomes the buyer in moment  t+1 (          ) then  a careful agent chooses 
his price in moment t as his price in moment t+1(              ). The risky 
agent chooses the price in moment t+1 the price which is less his price in moment t 
on value d(                ), if it possible (             ) and he 
chooses his previous price (     ) if it is impossible(             ). 
 The agent which was a buyer in moment t   
 
      ) and becomes a seller in 
moment t+1 (           do the same with one difference that risky agent  
increases his price in moment t+1,if it possible (              ). If in this case 
the agent which was a seller in moment t   
 
     )   becomes the waiting agent 
in moment  t+1    
 
     ) then  a careful agent chooses his price in moment t as 
his price in moment t+1(              ). The risky agent chooses the price in 
moment t+1 the price such that it is more his price in moment t on value d(      
            ). The agent which was a buyer in moment t  (        )   )and 
becomes a waiting agent in moment t+1 (         )   do the same with one 
difference that risky agent  decreases his price in moment t+1(              
   ),if it possible (             ). If in this case the agent which was a seller 
in moment t  (        )remains the seller in moment  t+1 (         ) then  a 
careful agent chooses his price in moment t+1 such that it is less  his price in 
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moment t on value d(              ). The risky agent chooses the price in 
moment t+1 the price which more his price in moment t on value d(        
         , if it possible ((             ) and he chooses his previous price 
(     ) if it is impossible((            ). 
The agent which was a buyer in moment t             ) and remains a buyer  
  
 
         in moment t+1 do the same with one difference that  careful 
agent increases his price(                )and risky agent  decreases his 
price in moment t+1 (                ),if it possible (              ). 
If the agent is a waiting agent in moment t   
 
       then his quantity of 
commodity and quantity of money are the same in moment t+1 (        
                   ). If a waiting agent          t becomes the seller 
  
 
         t then he establish new price by the following algorithm. When he 
is careful agent his price in moment t+1 is equals his price in moment t (      
1=  ( )). If he is risky agent then his price in moment t+1 is more his price in 
moment t on value d if it is possible (                ), if it is impossible 
(                  then both prices are equal. 
If a waiting agent becomes the buyer then he establish new price by the following 
algorithm. When he is careful agent his price in moment t+1 is equals his price  in 
moment t (             ). If he is risky agent then his price in moment t+1 is 
less his price in moment t on value d                   ) if it is possible 
(             ), if it is impossible then both prices are equal. 
If he is a waiting agent remain the waiting agent then he must take in account the 
variation of average price of market) i.e. u(t)-u(t-1) . 
If he has a commodity and he is a careful agent then he decreases his price on 
value d (               )). If he has commodity and he is risky agent then 
decreases his price                 ) on value d if u(t)-u(t-1) nonpositive 
and not change his price in the opposite case. 
If he has no commodity but he has some money and he is a careful agent then he 
increase his price on value d (               )). If he has no commodity but 
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he has some money and he is risky agent then increase his price on value d     
          ) if u(t)-u(t-1) nonnegative and not change his price i        
     )  in the opposite case.   
So we have described the changing of prices of participants of our model of the 
market. It is important to note that our algorithm of change of statuses and prices 
by participants is not the alone variant which is logically justified. We shall write 
this algorithm by formulas in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
3. The characteristics of the spectrum of prices  
 
We shall try to give the description of the set of variables                    . 
We shall name this set by spectrum of prices just the same way it was in our 
previous works.  
Denote by (t)=                                 and we shall name this value 
by width of spectrum of prices of participants of trade in moment  of time t.. 
Denote also (t)=                           and we shall name this value by 
divergence of spectrum of prices of participants of trade in moment  of time t 
We can see the following inequalities as a consequences from the algorithm of 
change of statuses and prices which have been described in the previous section .  
We remark that according the our algorithm for participant (careful and risky) 
which became the seller in moment t+1 must be              ) and for 
participant (careful and risky) which became the buyer in moment t+1  must be 
            ).  Also we can note that participant of market   becomes in 
moment t+1   a waiting agent when he was seller or buyer in moment t  if      
1=0 or if    +1=0 only. Except it  we can see that for any waiting agent exist 
some moment when he become seller or buyer. We have assertion 1. 
19 
  
Assertion 1. There exist some moment of time    that beginning with moment of 
time    will be  (t)>0, (t) >0 for t>T0 .  If         then for t>   will be either 
xi(t)=0 or yi(t)=0. 
Let denote by: 
                             ,                              , 
                                      
                                     
                                      
                                     
The assertion 2 , 3 an 4 follow  from  the our algorithm also. 
Assertion 2. For t>     we have                                 
                         
Assertion 3. The such     exist  that for any t>   will be: (t)            
     
 
 
             
 
 
   where   is as much as desired small but constant 
value. 
Assertion 4.If u(t-1) is sufficiently large then in the case when u(t)-u(t-1)>0 will 
prove to be  u(t+1)-u(t)<0 or u(t+2)-u(t+1)<0. If  u(t-1) is sufficiently small then  
in the case when u(t)-u (t-1)<0 will prove to be u(t+1)-u(t)>0 or u(t+2)-u(t+1)>0. 
The consequence 1 from assertion 4.The maximal time in which the participant i 
not change his status is less or equal four moment of time. 
The consequence 2 from assertions 3,4.There exist such         that for any  
t>    will be                           . 
(The proofs of assertion 1-4 and the consequences from assertion 4 see in [14] 
 
 
4. The investigation of the model with the identical and constant risk 
relation by computer experiments. 
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The set of 5N numbers                                                    
                                      defines the state of our system in 
moment of  time t. We shall denote this set of numbers (state of our system) by r(t). 
Let to note that the value     ) takes one from three meaning 1,0,-1 and it  change 
during the time and a value          takes one from two meanings and in our case it 
is constant during the time. Values       and       take meaning in interval [0,1] 
with conditions:         
   
    ,         
   
    . Variable       takes meaning in 
the some interval. The algorithm of transformation from r(t) to r(t+1) was 
described   in the section 2, i.e. dynamics of the system have been defined. The 
state of system for which r(t+1)=r(t) is named by steady state. 
Model of closed market which was described above was found very complicated 
for analytical investigation. At least author could not do it with success. It is the 
first reason of that we had created the computer model of our system by using strict 
logical description of model from second section of this paper.  We can mention 
simple example of the steady state. Let we have system which consists from one 
buyer with .5  units of money, one seller which has .5 units of commodity, one 
waiting agent with .5 units of money and one waiting agent with .5 units of 
commodity and let each agent has prices which equals units. The price of bargain 
between buyer and seller will be unit and accordingly with our algorithm we shall 
have in next moment the same state of system that has been in the initial moment. 
We could mention also simple examples some cyclic trajectories when r(t+2)=r(t) , 
but there was no steady states and cyclic  trajectories in our computer experiments 
with this system which has many participants(N>100). But we can see in the 
experiments that our trajectory belongs to some set of states of system all time 
after some moment of time. We shall name such set of states of system    for 
which if r(t)    M then should 
be                                                      
                                            
                      ,                     
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Let note the following.        is the common quantity of commodity , which  
sellers are proposing for sale and       Y is the common quantity of money which 
is destined for buy of  commodity on the first step of moment of time t.  
The choice of the initial state of system has a great importance for investigation at 
computer investigation of system. It is obviously that there are some initial states at 
which system very quickly will be in corresponding stationary set. For example 
such initial condition is a state system in which a part of participants has no money 
and commodity but other part of participants has all money and commodity. We 
choose as a initial state a state r(0)  when the distributions of unit of commodity 
and unit money between participant is close to uniform distribution.  We have 
chosen        and        distributed uniformly on the interval between zero and 
one. After it we normalised it in order the sum of commodity become equal unit 
and sum of money become in system equal unit.  
We had investigated the model of closed market in many computer experiments by 
observations of trajectory of some system’s general variables during a very long 
time of development of our system ( more than 20000 moments of time) . First of 
all the result of all experiments is the following correction of analytical results of 
third section. There exist such      that for any t>   there is the following:    
                
                           
                       
                            
These experimental results concern the case when                ,N,0   
     are constant and they are equal during the experiment 1 or -1. But  we  
investigated separately in  the first series of our  experiments the case when  
                                not change during the time and the case when 
                         not change during the time . 
At first we investigated the first case. 
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The following experimental results concerns to first case only. We consider the 
case at first when all participants of model are careful in all moments of a time. 
The two our papers [14],[15] was devoted to investigation of dynamics of model in 
this same case. Now we also begin the investigation of our model in case when 
  (t)=1 (i=1,2,…,N) for 0    . 
The convergence of trajectory of system to some stationary set is the most 
important conclusion from our  computer investigation of dynamics of the system. 
If                        during all time then there exists such u0 and such 
moment of time  that for each t>  takes place r(t)   , where for all points of set 
   will be              +5d. 
 Unfortunately it is unique property of set   which we were able to establish until 
now. But it is may most important result of our investigation. Analytical proof of 
this fact and other our results is connected with very large difficulties which we 
cannot overcome. 
 We can see on the figure 1 the change of average price of market for two 
experiments:  the first when trajectory begins from the large value of average price 
and the second when trajectory begins from small value of average price of market. 
In both cases after some time   both trajectories belong to   . 
Our more accurate observation of computer trajectory of average price of the 
market have shown to us that  trajectory tends to set    not monotonically and her 
changes in this set is not monotonic also  but it hesitates near his average value. 
There are two kinds of hesitations of u(t) : first kind is a hesitations in short time (a 
increasing of u(t) after   a decreasing of u(t) during  several moments) and not 
regular  hesitations of u(t)  during of large time (with large and not constant period)    
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Figure1. The graph of change of average prices of closed market during the time 
for two initial conditions (N=300,d=0.005,u(0)= 3 u(0)=0.5, one step in axis of 
time on the graph equals 100 moment of time).  
 
We can see from graph 2 that these hesitations are not regular also when         
and periods of these hesitations are not equal (we have not observed any regularity 
of these hesitations). 
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 Figure 2 The graph of change of average prices of closed market  u(t) during the 
time when r(t)       N=300,d=0.005,u(0)= 3 , one step in axis of time on the 
graph equals 100 moment of time 8000        ). 
 
There are the initial value of u(t) is 3 , and we consider trajectory u(t) in interval 
time from 8000 moments until 13000 moments, when        The average u(t) 
on this interval is 0.8378(         ), the minimal value of u(t) is  0.8271 and 
the maximal value of u(t) on this interval is 0.8488. So we have on this interval  
                     . 
    If r(t)    , then  it is not necessary that r(t) is equilibrium state. The supply 
which is evaluated in money can be not equal to a demand (quantity of money to 
purchases) in the most of moments of time. In most computer experiments when 
r(t)       the value                      is  rather large. Really, there are some 
number of waiting agents which have money and commodity, which take not part 
in trade in this moment. It is interesting to consider a periods which consist from 
several sequential moment of time. Accordingly consequence 1 from assertion 4 
the each agent can be continuously in one from a varying sets of agents 
(               
         
   
(t)  not more than 4 moments of time. It is not difficult to 
understand from this remark that each participant changes several statuses and after 
some time return to the initial status. These arguments can partly explain the one 
experimental fact. Let denote by         the average value of absolute value of 
averaged for several (L) previous moments of time the difference between the 
demand which is evaluated in money and quantity of money which  all buyers have  
: 
                               
   
        
Our computer experiments have shown for 17<L<25 it had turned out be       
     if  r(t)        . So we can understand it as a equilibrium on the average. 
In particular the figure 3  say to us that   states from set       correspond   to 
equilibrium on the average for l8 previous moments of time (at L=18   ). 
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Figure 3.The difference between the effective demand and supply and the same 
difference which was averaged during the 18 previous moments of time for the 
trajectory  entirely belonging to the set      n=300,d=0.002 9500<t<9600) 
 
We shall name the value                 by asset of participant with index i in 
moment of time t. It is obviously that average asset of participant of market equals 
        
 
  . We investigated of the dynamics of the ratio of square root of the sum of 
the deviates of asset of each agent from the average asset  to the average value of 
asset of agent in moment t. We denotes this value by S(t). 
 
                                  
 
   
   
              
We can see the very slow reduction S(t) with the during the time  in  fig.4 
And we see the reason of it in the fact that all participants have the same 
mechanism of decision making –they are all careful.   
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Figure 4. The dynamics of S(t) for case when d=0.005,N=500, 0<t<15000 
 
Now we can discuss the behavior of system when there are risky agents as 
participants of our market. At first we consider the case when all participants are 
risky agents.  In such case we cannot say about convergence of trajectory of system 
to some stationary set of states but some quasiregular regime of hesitations is 
establishing for trajectory of the average price of the market.   
The convergence of trajectory of system to some stationary set is also the 
important conclusion from our computer investigation of dynamics of the system. 
If                        during all time then there exists such u1 and such 
moment of time 1 that for each t>1  takes place r(t)   , where for all points of 
set   will be               +80d. 
All trajectories of u(t)  was situated inside of the rather large interval        
              when      and 4000<t< 1000000 in very large quantity of  
experiments . That was for any case of initial conditions which are corresponding 
to the description of section 2.  It took place at all initial values of u(t ) from 
u(0)=0.2 until u(0)=20.But for t>2000 in all our experiments u(t) hesitated. But 
these hesitations were not regular. There was no unique period or unique amplitude 
of hesitation. Periods of hesitation were different, but it was not less the 1500 
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moments of time and not more 2300 moments of time. The values of u(t) hesitates 
also was not less 100d and not more 200d. We can see the examples of this 
situation on the fig. 5 where we have two trajectories of u(t): one which begins 
from u(0)=0.2   and second trajectory which begins from u(0)=3.We calculated 
average values, minimal and maximal values for interval  2000<t<14000. For the 
one case (for which u(0)=0.2 ) the average value u(t) equals 0.8788, minimal value 
0.1764 and maximal value equals 1.7182. For the second case (for which u(0)=0.2 
)  the average value u(t) equals 1.0446, minimal value 0.5670 and maximal value 
equals 1.8414 
  
Figure 5. Two trajectories of average price of market when all participants are 
risky agents.(N=500, d=0.005,u(0)=0.2 and u(0)=3.3. 0<t<14000). 
 
It is necessary to note that in small diapason of time (about 100 moments of time) 
trajectory has small hesitation i.e. increase after decrease. We could see similar 
picture above in the case when all participants are careful. 
Dynamics of S(t) is very similar to the dynamics in the  case when all agents are 
careful i.e. S(t) changes in  very small way on the large period of time. There are 
two reason of this phenomenon: the first is that in initial condition a assets are 
distributed uniformly among participants, the second is that mechanism of choice 
of status and price is the same for all participants. 
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       It is very interesting to consider the case when the part of participants of 
market are careful agents and other participants are risky agents. There are many 
variants of this situation but we consider in this paper only one. In the initial 
moment of time each participant prefers to   be careful agent in all time of 
experiment with probability 0.5, consequently he is risky agent in all moments of 
time with probability 0.5 also. First of all the trajectory of u(t) is interesting for us. 
Many computer trajectories with different initial conditions (which are 
corresponding to section 2) show us fundamental properties of behavior  of u(t) 
during the long time .   u(t) converges to some interval of its values and after some 
moment of time it is in this interval of values. If      is a average value of u(t) after 
moment of first location in this interval until time of finish of the experiment then 
during the his time will be;    -50d<u(t)<  +50d. This interval is much more than 
the same interval in the case all careful agents and less than same interval in the 
case of all risky agents. We can see in the fig 6 the graph of u(t) where   =1,0344 
and after  t=4000 we have   -10d<u(t)<  +50d. 
 
   
 
Figure 6. The trajectory of average price of the market in the case 
where about half of agents are careful and other agents are risky  
agents. .(N=500, d=0.005,u(0)=2. 0<t<15500). 
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The behavior of value S(t) in tis case is rather interesting. The S(t) increases with increasing of time. It say to us that risky 
choice tends to growth of assets of participant. We can see in fig. 7 that during the 15200 moments of time the S(t) 
increases from .02 until 0.08. For more clearness we can mention the following dates. In The initial moment of time of one 
from our experiments   the summary quantity assets of all careful agents was 1.512  the same for all risky agents was 1.488 
at initial average price of market equal 2. After 15200 moments of time the summary quantity assets of all careful agents 
was 0.1698  the same for all risky agents was 1.9302 at  average price of market equal 1.1. in the same experiment. 
 
 
.  
Figure 7. the graph of S(t) in the case where about half of agents are careful and 
other agents are risky agents. .(N=500, d=0.005,u(0)=2. 0<t<15500). 
 
 
5. The agent based model of closed market with single commodity as 
a dynamic system of interacting of automata  
 
Participants of market choose the status in the moment of time t+1  by using 
comparison of average price of all their bargains in the moment t  with the average 
price of all bargains of the market i.e. average price of market in this moment of 
time. We think that this mechanism of choice is necessary for regularity of 
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spectrum of prices, it is logically justified and rather simple. But each participant 
must to be careful agent or risky agent constantly when he chooses the price for 
next moment during the all time . We shall consider in this section the market 
where each participant can choose  to be careful agent or risky agent in this 
moment as a consequence of his successful result or unsuccessful result in previous 
moment. 
We shall use in this section the results of I.M Gelfant and M.L. Tsetlin about 
behavior of finite automata and modeling of simplest forms of behavior (see 
[1],[2]) in particular we shall use their model of behavior of automata in stationary 
random media.  We must remind of some definitions and some results from their 
theory. 
There are n actions of our deterministic automata which we denote by 
             . If f(t)=        then we shall say that automaton fulfils the action    in 
moment t. There are  M states of automaton which we shall denote by 
              (M  )  and there are some correspondence between states and 
actions of automaton. M is named memory capacity.  t represents time and   takes 
integer values 1,2,...,. There is some input variable  s(t) which depends on  time 
and which can take only two value (1,0) The value s=0 is called the "nonpenalty 
and the value s=1 is called the "penalty" of an automaton. The dynamics of 
deterministic  automaton is described by two equalities: 
                                   
The matrix           determines the transitions of states for an 
deterministic automaton in the following manner: if at the instant t the automaton 
is in state    , then at t + 1 it will make a transition to a state          such 
that                ., for l j we have                      ., 
 An automaton is in the stationary random medium                    
if the actions of the automaton and the values of its input variable are related as 
follows: the action   (         ,n), if, is  performed by the automaton at the 
moment t  then the medium generates the value s  =1 (a penalty) in the moment t 
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+1 with the probability    
    
 
 and the value s = 0 (a nonpenalty) with the 
probability   =
    
 
. We assume here that        . 
The probabilities     of the transition of the automaton from state    ( to which 
corresponds the action             )) to state    is given by the formula: 
    =                        where              if               when  
         and s(t)=1 and            if             when           and 
s(t)=1   (          means the same when s(t)=0)  .  Also   the matrix          is 
stochastic. 
Therefore the functioning of the automaton in a stationary random medium is 
described by a Markov chain. When this chain turns out ergodic then final 
probabilities of automaton states exist in a given medium and they are independent 
of its initial state. This situation is in the most cases which were investigated in this 
theory. An automaton is named symmetric if the expected value of a nonpenalty   
in any stationary random medium is a symmetric function of               l 
Denote  W(C) the  expected nonpenalty  for the automaton in the medium C. We 
shall say that the behavior of the automata is purposeful in the media C if he he 
tend to increase his gain i.e W(C)>(a1+a2+…aK)/K. 
A sequence of automata will be called asymptotically optimal if 
                             . 
An automaton is belonging to an asymptotically optimal sequence, if when m is 
sufficiently large, he performs almost exclusively the action for which the 
probability of a nonpenalty is maximum. 
We shall use in our model one simplest asymptotically optimal automaton which 
was proposed and investigated by M.L. Tzetlin in the year 1961. It is an automaton 
with linear tactic        with two action and with 2m states. m states correspond to 
each action. 
Let the states               corresponds to the first action (for example to be 
careful agent) and states                     corresponds to the second 
action (for example to be risky agent). 
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When s(t)=1 (nonpenalty) the change of state of automaton describes by following 
equations:             if         and i=1,2,3,…,m-1,m+1,…,2m-1, 
          if          and i=m or i=2m. When s(t)=0 (penalty) the change 
of state of automaton describes by following equations:             if 
        and i=,2,3,…,m,m+1,…,2m, 
            if          and            . if         
It is proved in the Thetlin works that this automaton sequences m=1,2,... is 
asymptotically optimal in stationary random media.  
     There is no stationary random media in our model but we must note that in 
mentioned work of Gelfand and Tzetlin some games of automata was investigated. 
Some games of automata was considered in the Tzetlin book[2]. He considered the 
actions of automaton as strategies of player which were automata in the game of N 
players. The set of values of input variables s(t+1)=(                      
  ) in the moment t+1 (values  of winnings and failures of these automata) he 
considered as result of game. The game of automata is defined when for each lot of 
game ( i.e a set of strategies ( actions of automaton) the probability of its result 
p(     ,…,     ,      ,   ) =p(f,s) is defined, and            takes place at 
any f. So our game of automats consists from sequence of lots  f(t). The system of 
values p(f,s) which defines the game of automaton gives to us the game of N 
players in the sense of theory of games. Really  the functions of payment        
            which defines the game have meaning of the expectation of a prize of 
the player i when player use strategies    i=1,2,..,N and  we can reconstruct of them 
identically  from probabilities of  results  p(f,s). 
Our model of closed market has several differences from games of automata which 
were researched by Gelfand, Tzetlin and their coworkers. It is necessary to note, 
that finite automata with linear tactics was used with success in modeling by games 
of automata.  
 In the first place we can consider our dynamic system as a multistep game where 
the result in the step t  depends on the state of the  system in this moment (r(t)). 
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Consequently the probability of nonpenalty of  player depend on not only his 
strategy in moment t but it depends on positions on the market of other players in 
this moment  also. In the second place the result of step of a participant of market 
which took part in trade depend on not only his profit from selling  or buying in 
this moment but also it depend on his possibilities in the next step. For example if 
seller i sells his commodity in moment t by average price          it is important to 
him  by which price he can buy the commodity in the next moment of time (in next 
step) t+1. For this estimate he can use the average price of market which is 
established on market after trade in moment t i.e. u(t). He estimates how much he 
increase the quantity of his commodity after two step. The same will be for 
participant of market which is a buyer in the first step of  moment t and took part in 
trade in moment t. Gain in this game is defined by result of two step, that usually 
for the speculative closed market, but in moment t we can only estimate future 
result in moment t+1.  So the t average price of this participant is evaluated in 
comparison of opportunity spectrum of prices and u(t-1) side by side with 
evaluation of average price of  market u(t) .  The estimation of future by average 
price of market u(t) is a one possible variant only which we have used. It is used in 
our definitions of probabilities of nonpenalty for participant which took part in 
trade in moment t. As a difference of it the participant which took no part in trade 
(seller, buyer or waiting) evaluates how much additional commodity he can buy by 
new average market price after trade in moment t ( if he has money) or how much 
additional money  he can receive by  new average market price after trade in 
moment t (if he has commodity) in comparison with his possibilities in moment t 
by average price of market u(t-1). We would like to note that probability of  
nonpenalty is a subjective estimation of the his position on the market by this 
player./ 
    These researches were fulfilled by computer modeling and it was shown by their 
results that some asymptotic optimal automata can successfully play in some 
interesting games. Therefore we can consider our model with automata as a 
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participants as some game of automata similar it  in the  Gelfand, Tzetlin and their 
coworkers  the computer research. 
For full description of our model of the closed market with automata       as a 
participants we must define the probabilities of nonpenalty for all agents in our 
model( sellers which have sold  the all their commodity, buyers which have spent 
all their money and for other participants of market).  
We shall mean the estimation by agent of change of his position on the market as  a 
reaction of random medium on the previous action of  participant. At first we 
define the probability of nonpenalty for sellers which had sold any quantity of the 
commodity in the begin of moment t . Each such seller has sold  his commodity by 
average price        and if             he becomes  the buyer and can buy 
commodity in moment t+1 by  prices which are near u(t). Therefore their 
estimation of success is  
     
    
. The probability of nonpenalty will be the ratio of 
this value to maximal possible value of                                     
        . 
Let when         tends to u(t) then  probability of nonpenalty tends to 1/2 
If               then he becomes the waiting agent which has only money. 
The probability of nonpenalty will be the ratio of this value to minimal possible 
value of                         in this case.  
We denote by           probability of nonpenalty when participants of market 
choose in moment t to be careful or risky i.e.   (t)  ,  (t) ,…,  (t)  . 
Let when         equals to u(t) then  probability of nonpenalty equals to ½. 
According to our algorithm must be                         and  
            (t)        when t>1.  First of all we consider participants which 
take part in trade in moment of time t. When our participant of market is a seller 
and              then maximal value of         could be   
                           .   We denote in this case by   
 
        the ratio of 
real difference   (t)-u(t) to maximal possible value of this difference 
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     . When our participant of market is a seller and       
       then minimal value of         could be                    .   We 
denote in this case by          of ratio of real difference u(t)-       to   maximal 
possible value of this difference                      .So    
 
       
             
                 
           
    and            = 
             
                  
   and 
probability of nonpenalty is in this case : 
       
 
 
 
                           
                           
   
When our participant is a buyer, which had spent any  his money we can use the 
same but symmetrical  arguments and can denote in the case                 by 
          the ratio of real difference   (t)-u(t) to maximal possible value of this 
difference     
                  
   
 
           but in case            we denote by  
        of ratio of real difference u(t)-        to   maximal possible value of this 
difference                      .  . So    
 
       
             
                
           
    and           = 
             
                  
   and 
probability of nonpenalty is in this case: 
 
       
 
 
 
                           
                           
   
 
Now we define the probability of nonpenalty for agents which had any quantity of  
the commodity in the begin of moment t but they  could not sell all their 
commodity or took no part in trade at all (waiting agent). There are many 
possibilities to define the probabilities of nonpenalty, but we shall use one from 
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simplest definitions of these values for the first stage of the creation and 
investigation of our system.  
 Let to note that a growth of average price of market is profitable for the agent 
which has commodity and his probability of penalty or nonpenalty equals 1/2 when 
u(t)=u(t-1) .  When u(t)>u(t-1) then probability of nonpenalty is more then 1/2.  
When u(t)<u(t-1) then probability of nonpenalty is less than 1/2 . If difference 
between u(t) and u(t-1) is maximally possible value for the state in moment t then 
the probability equals 1. If difference between u(t) and u(t-1) is minimally possible 
value for the state in moment t then the probability equals zero. We define the 
probability of nonpenalty  by using a ratio of change of u(t) in the last moment of 
time  (u(t)-u(t-1)) to maximal possible change of u(u) for spectrum of prices of this 
market in moment t. We must note that really the situation on the market (u(t)) not 
depends from action of such participant. Consequently a probability of nonpenalty 
also not depends on these actions. When u(t)>u(t-1) then the maximal possible  
increase of average price of market is                                  
   . We denote as     the ratio of real increase of average price of 
market to maximal possible increase i.e.                     
                            . When u(t) u(t-1) then the maximal 
possible  decrease of average price of market is           
(      =1   +u(t-1))/2.  Denote also by           the ratio of real 
decrease of average price of market to maximal possible decrease i.e. 
      
           
                       
  
. So the probability of nonpenalty   is given in this case by the formula: 
 p(t)= 
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We define also the probability of nonpenalty for agents which had some quantity 
of  the money in the begin of moment t but could not spend all money or they took 
no part in trade at all(witing agent) . Let  to note that a decrease of average price of 
market  is profitable for the agent which has money and his  probability of 
nonpenalty equals 1/2 when u(t)=u(t-1) . . When u(t)<u(t-1) then the maximal 
possible  increase of average price of market is                        
             . We denote as     the ratio of real increase of average price of 
market to maximal possible increase  i.e.      
              
            
            
  . When 
u(t) u(t-1) then the maximal possible  decrease of average price of market is 
                                  Denote also by   
        the ratio 
of real decrease of average price of market to maximal possible decrease i.e. 
      
           
                       
  
   
So the probability of nonpenalty after action k(k=1,-1)  is given in this case by the 
formula which similar to the correspondent formula for agent which has 
commodity  : 
 
p(t)= 
 
 
                       
 
 
                      
  
 
We would like to note that          also as p(t) are a piecewise linear functions of 
estimation of  relation of  prices and it not depends on  volume of profit  of the 
participant of market.  This is a simplest model of probability of nonpenalty may 
be and we shall consider further the case when it depend on changing of 
commodity or money of participant and we shall consider a nonlinear case  of that 
dependence.  We shall investigate further in this section this market as a medium 
with these probabilities of  penalty or nonpenalty and automata         as 
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participants  with different initial condition of market and different memory of the 
automaton by many computer experiments. 
The most important fact which we have received from our computer experiments 
from model with automats       as participants is following. 
  If all participants of market are automata        then there exists such moment of 
time    that for each t>     takes place r(t)   , where for all points of set   will 
be                +20d. Where    
 
 
       
      
    
 ,  is enough 
large. 
In the fig 8 we can see three trajectories of u(t) for which u(0) are different but for 
all of them the previous assertion take place 
 
Figure 8. The graphs of u(t) in the cases  of different initial conditions, where 
        and where participants are automata        (N=300, 
d=0.005,m=8,u(0)=30,u(0)=15,u(0)=0.2. 0<t<5500).  
We can see from fig.8 that for many different initial value u(0) value r(t) (t>     
belong  to set    . In this figure we can see the trajectories only for three initial 
conditions, but we have fulfilled many experiments to be sure in previous 
assertion. We can see in all these computer experiments that in the set    all 
trajectories hesitate in bounded interval nearly from the average on time value u(t) 
just the same way as it is in our assertion. The examples of oscillations in the set 
   of same trajectories from fig 8 we see in fig 9. 
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Figure 9 . The graphs of u(t) for 8500<t<10000  for cases of different initial 
condition but with the same volume of memory of automata         (N=300, 
d=0.005,m=8,u(0)=30,u(0)=15,u(0)=0.2. 0<t<5500). 
 
 These oscillations have a different character for different initial condition but our 
assertion is fulfilled for them.  We have fulfilled many experiments with different 
volume of memory of automata from m=1 until m=8. The our assertion is fulfilled 
in all experiments but trajectories shows different character of  their oscillations for 
different m .  We can see it on the fig 10. where we can see irregular oscillation of 
trajectories but for m=2 the oscillation is similar to regular one. We saw in our 
experiments that the average value of number of state for k(t)=1,-1 in moment t is 
more 1 and less 2 . Let note that we said about average value, but real state of 
automaton can reach of the number m or 2m sometimes. 
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Figure 10. Trajectories of u(t) for 6500<t<8000 for same initial condition and 
different volume of memory of automata.. (N=300, d=0.005,m=1,2,4,8,u(0)=15,. 
6500<t<8000).  
 
We investigated in our experiment the ratio of the number careful agents to the 
number of risky agents in each moment of time and dynamics of value S(t). 
Our computer experiments have shown that this ratio have hesitated around unit, 
but sometime was about one quarter or three quarter .  
The value S(t)  had shown very small variation. We think that absence some large 
change of  distribution assets between partners is connected with the fact that all 
partners have the same mechanism of choice may be.   
We have used the piecewise linear function for definition of probabilities of 
nonpenalty before. But average prices of participant          which is close to 
maximal and minimal value may occur very rarely. Therefore we tried to use for 
definition of these probabilities the non linear function which has a small 
derivative when its argument is near to possible maximal or minimal value of 
average price of trade of participants. The function 
  
    
 is simplest function which 
has these characteristics by our opinion. In the second stage of modeling of closed 
market with automata as participants we have used the following functions as 
probabilities of nonpenalty. First of all we consider participants which take part in 
0
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trade in moment of time t. When our participant of market is a seller, we shall set 
that 
       
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
         
 
           
               
 
 
 
         
 
           
                 
   
When our participant of market is a buyer, we shall set that 
       
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
         
 
           
               
 
 
 
         
 
           
                 
  
Now we define the probability of nonpenalty for agents which had any quantity of  
the commodity in the begin of moment t but they  could not sell all their 
commodity or took no part in trade at all (waiting agent). 
     
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
          
 
            
                
 
 
 
          
 
            
                   
  
We define also the probability of nonpenalty for agents which had some quantity 
of  the money in the begin of moment t but could not spend all money or they took 
no part in trade at all(waiting agent). 
       
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
          
 
            
                
 
 
 
          
 
            
                   
  
As above we have received from our computer experiments from model with 
automats       as a participant the following. 
  If all participants of market are automata        then there exists such moment of 
time    that for each t>     takes place r(t)   , where for all points of set   will 
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be                +20d. Where    
 
  
       
       
    
 ,  is enough 
large. 
We can see in all these computer experiments that in the set    all trajectories 
hesitate in bounded interval nearly from the average on time value u(t) by just the 
same way as it is in our assertion. The examples of comparison of oscillations in 
the set     when we use the first variant of probabilities of nonpenalty and in set 
     when we use the second variant of probabilities of nonpenalty   for trajectories 
with the same initial condition we see in fig 11. We can see in these figures that the 
hesitations of average price of our model of closed market have amplitudes in case 
of linear dependence of probability of nonpenalty which are less than amplitudes in 
nonlinear case.  
 
Figure 11. Trajectories of u(t) for linear and nonlinear functions which defines the 
probabilities of nonpenalty for m=8, N=300,d=.005, 2000<t<8000. 
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Figure 12. Trajectories of u(t) for linear functions which defines the probabilities 
of nonpenalty for m=2,8,16, N=300,d=.005, 4000<t<10000. 
 
 
Figure 13. Trajectories of u(t) for nonlinear functions which defines the 
probabilities of nonpenalty for m=2,8,16, N=300,d=.005, 4000<t<10000. 
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Figure 14. Trajectories of S(t) for linear and nonlinear functions which defines the 
probabilities of nonpenalty for m=8, N=300,d=.005, 2000<t<8000. 
 
 We should like to say that is the first research of similar model, and  it will be 
need to investigate these problems also in further research of  this or more 
adequate model. 
It is very interesting question is problem of equilibrium in our model. It is 
obviously that there is no equilibrium in each moment of time. We denoted above: 
                             
   
       
 
Values       when L is different are interesting for us. Our numerical results show 
to us that if  L is near to 17-21 then       is rather small  and less then 
                  at any t>  . Where     is the moment of time, which is rather 
large.  In the figure 14      equals 6000, this result is in accordance with the fact 
that in during of 18 steps every participant of market will be in every status. 
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Figure 15. Values         for 12000>t >10000 for  L=1,10,20,50 
. (N=300,d=0.005, and participant is automaton       ,m=8) 
 
There is other asymptotically optimal automaton D2m,2     which is rather similar to  
automaton        with two action and with 2m states. m states correspond to each 
action. States               corresponds to the first action (for example to be 
careful agent) and states                     correspond to the second 
action (for example to be risky agent). 
When s(t)=1 (nonpenalty) the change of state of automaton describes by following 
equations:               if         and i=1,2,3,…,m-1,               . 
if i=m+1,…,2m-1.          if          and i=m or i=2m. When s(t)=0 
(penalty) the change of state of automaton describes by following equations (like 
in the case of L2m,2:             if         and 
i=,2,3,…,m,m+1,…,2m,            if          and                if 
i=1,2,…,m-1,m+1,…,2m-1, and φ(t+1)=φ(t) if          or            . 
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Figure 16. Trajectories of u(t) for automata  L16,2  and   D16,2  при N=300, 1000<t<10000,d-
=0.005, 
 
 
6. Herd behavior of participants of our model of market 
 
There are many serious reasons to propose that herd behavior among participants 
of market can arise as a consequence of change in external environment only. 
But in this section we will try to find whether it is possible in closed market as a 
result of internal processes of interactions between participants of market. 
In the section 4 we have considered model of the behavior of market participant 
when he used the careful choice only.  If all participants of market use only careful 
choice then we could consider this situation as one from cases of herd behavior. 
We found by computer experiments the convergence of trajectory of system to 
some stationary set M0. Some examples of trajectories at such herd behavior were 
illustrated by fig. 1.  
In the section 4 we have considered the case when all market participants have 
used only risky choices of their prices. From our computer investigation of 
dynamics of the system we see the convergence of trajectory of system to some 
stationary set M1 with quasiregular hesitation u(t) inside this set M1. We have seen 
this situation on fig.5. 
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The comparison of the trajectories of u(t) on the fig.4 and fig 5 show to us that in 
the case when choice of all partners is a risky strategy then hesitations of u(t) is 
more than in the case when choice of all participants are careful decisions. The 
next interesting case, which has as a consequence significant hesitations of u(t) is a 
case when all sellers choose the risky actions and all buyers choose the careful 
action or vice versa. These seems the more realistic cases which maybe   are 
observed in real stock market   situations, which can be considered as a case of 
herd behavior of participants. 
    The situation where every seller choose the new price by careful algorithm and 
in the same time every buyer choose his new price by risky algorithm in all 
moments of time is connected with decrease of average price of market. We could 
to consider this behavior of the collective of participants of the market as a kind of 
herd behavior and we can think that sellers and buyers play to go a bear in during 
the interval of time. If this behavior of participant of the market takes place during 
the large interval of time, then we can see the following fact. There exist some 
value of u(t) equal u3   and moment of time  T3 that for t> T3 will be u3-20d<u(t)< 
u3+20d. We can see this phenomenon in the figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Trajectories u(t) in cases when all sellers prefer the risky choice of price 
and all buyers prefer careful choice of price in all moments of time (it is similar to 
go to bull) (N=300, d=0.005,u(0)=0.2,u(0)=2.5 and u(0)=2.8. 0<t<10000). 
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The situation where every buyer choose the new price by careful algorithm and in 
the same time every seller choose his new price by risky algorithm in all moments 
of time is connected with increase of average price of market. We could to 
consider this behavior of the collective of participants of the market as a kind of 
herd behavior and we can think that sellers and buyers play to go a bull in during 
the interval of time. If this behavior of participant of the market takes place during 
the large interval of time, then we can see the following fact. There exist some 
value of u(t) equal u4   and moment of time  T4 that for t> T4 will be u4-20d<u(t)< 
u4+20d. We can see this phenomenon in the figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18. Trajectories u(t) in cases when all sellers prefer the careful choice of 
price and all buyers prefer risky choice of price in all moments of time (it is similar 
to go to a bear) (N=300, d=0.005,u(0)=0.2,u(0)=2 0<t<10000). 
 
The rather interesting case of behavior we can see when the all participants act to 
reduce or  they act to increase of average price of market turn out in the situation of 
small variation of average price of market( for example, the variation of the 
average price of  market  for several moments of time is less of the some small 
constant, how on fig.19) and change their behavior to the similar but opposite 
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behavior. We shall suppose that all sellers and all buyers change  their strategies ( 
careful to risky and vice versa) simultaneously . The criterion of this change in the 
moment t is: 
   
        
         
        
        
where   is enough small and     of course. We can see on the figure 19 very 
interesting hesitation of average price of market in this case.  
 
 
Figure 19. Trajectories u(t) in cases when all sellers prefer the risky choice of price 
and all buyers prefer careful choice of price in one interval of time(it is similar to 
go to bull).If this strategy cannot give the increase of average price of market  they 
all change strategy:  all sellers prefer the careful choice of price and all buyers 
prefer risky choice of price in all moments of the next interval of time (it is similar 
to go to a bear) (N=300, d=0.005,u(0)=0.22,u(0)=1.9, 0<t<14000). 
 
The behavior of the participants of market when they are automata can be similar 
to herd behavior at the some situations on the market and at correspondent 
characters of their choice. Automata which are models of behavior of participant of 
market must be others and must include the choice of most analogical participants 
(buyers or sellers) in previous moment of time as signal which is on the input of 
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automata simultaneously with penalty or nonpenalty. But only one from these 
signals determines the action of automaton.    
During the first consideration we will model the situation which is similar to 
situation which was considered above in this section. Let there are three kinds of 
behaviors : the first kind is the following: all partners acts as a automata i.e. 
character of a choice of the price by partner(careful or risky)    depends on the 
result of his interactions in the previous moment of time  ( penalty or nonpenalty), 
the second kind is the following: all participants which have a any quantity of 
commodity use the risky choice of price  and all participants which have any 
quantity of money they use the careful  choice of price in the some interval of 
time(it is similar to go to bull) , the third kind is the following: all participants 
which has any quantity of commodity they use careful choice of price also all 
participants which has any quantity of money use the risky choice of price during 
the some interval of time (it is similar to go to a bear) . It is important that in the 
second and the third case all participants not use information about interaction in 
the previous moment of time but they use the criterion for stop of this kind of  
behavior. This criterion was formulated above.  
   
        
         
        
        
 
We shall propose that when participants of market stop a second or third kind of 
behavior they begin use the first kind of behavior i.e. become automata.  We 
propose that the first kind of behavior  must  to begin when the second or the  third 
kind of behavior was stoped by our criterion.. 
The first kind of behavior must be changed when the value of u(t) shows very 
small variation during to the rather large period of time. So we use the following 
criterion of stoppage of this kind of behavior: 
   
       
        
       
        
Where   is  some large interval of times, and l is less 5. 
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When the first kind of behavior is stopped the all partners choose  with probability 
of .5 the second or third kind of behavior of all participants of market. 
We fulfilled several computer experiments with model of herd behavior which was 
formulated above. 
 
 
Figure 20 . Trajectory of u(t) for model with automata which was described in 
section 4 and  two different trajectories  of u(t) for model when all sellers and all 
buyers  have possibilities to  use only one choice of prices(only careful for sellers 
and only risky buyers or vice versa) on the same interval of time and can return 
their behavior at  simple conditions to usual automata    as it was described above 
in this section 
(N=300,1<y<10000, d=0.05) 
  
We had investigated of the dynamics of  the  ratio of square root of the sum of the 
deviates of asset each agent from the average asset  to the average value of asset of 
agent in moment t  in the section 4 where we had interested by dynamics of system 
in which partners can use only careful choice of price. The value S(t)(see above) 
had characterized the distribution of the assets between all partners. The rather 
small value of S(t) and his decreasing was a consequence of a initial distribution of 
the assets between participants and the identical algorithm of  decision making for 
every partner. In  the case which we considering now the situation is similar. The 
value S(t)  decreases for the both models  first  models  where all partners are 
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automata      and the second for model with partners  which use the some 
variants of herd behavior. But it is interesting that herd behavior slow down this 
decreasing of S(t) how we can see it from fig. 21. 
    
 
 
Figure 21. The dynamics of of  the  ratio of square root of the sum of the deviates 
of asset of each agent from the average asset  to the average value of asset of agent 
in moment t - S(t)  for case of  partners which can demonstrate the herd behavior 
and for partners which can not do it. (N=300,1<y<10000, d=0.05) 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have formulated and investigated the simple model of closed market which is 
similar to stock market at least in few features.  The stimuluses of our research  not 
were defined by only  the our desire to prove analytically a some characteristics of 
a spectrum of prices but they were defined by also our desire  to extract the some 
features of market which are consequences of logically warranted mechanism of 
behavior of agents in the case of careful and risky choice. We also have tried to 
investigate the closed market as a game of automata with linear asymptotical 
optimal automata as participants. We noted that automata can use both careful and 
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risky choice depending on his state. Automata can also change his state and 
demonstrate purposeful behavior. There are two central result of investigation of 
our model by computer experiments. The first fact is a fact that in all experiments   
the average price of market has a small deviation from his average value along the 
time( averaging began after enough large moment of time  )when choices of all 
participants of market are careful. The second fact is fact that in all computer 
experiments the average price of market hesitates near his average value along the 
time  ( averaging also began after enough large moment of time ), and there are 
nonconstant but bounded amplitudes and not constant period when all participants 
of market use only risky choice. The using the careful and risky choice of one 
participant of market was investigated in the case of the consideration of the 
dynamics of this market as a game of automata. It is useful to note that behavior of 
trajectory of average price of market when all participants are careful is not similar 
to situation on the stock market even in the case of day when external situation 
changes in the very small way (almost constant fundamental value). But case when 
choices of all participants of the market are risky is more similar to real behavior of 
stock market price when the fundamental value is almost constant during the day. 
We ask our readers to understand that this work is first step in study   of closed 
market (stock market, for example) by computer agent based model of type of the 
game of automata. That is a reason of  many insufficiencies of this work and also a 
reason to discuss  of possibility to remove these insufficiencies and the path of 
further research. 
The first we cannot have fulfilled analytical description of the steady set  and 
for model with automata as agents we cannot have fulfilled any analytical 
investigation of steady set  and of the spectrum of prices. The great 
mathematical difficulties in analytical investigation of a similar systems  is the our 
justification  may be. At least we do not know now  are it possible to create some 
more simple models of  interaction of participants of market? But we know that is 
necessary to investigate some other models of decision making of agents. 
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In this research we had investigated the market with careful choice of participants 
and market with risky behavior of participant of market separately and we have 
united two previous model by using automata. But we use the very simple case of 
probability of nonpenalty and the case of most simple structure of automaton for 
the first step of research. 
The action of participant (choice of new status and choice of new price) which we 
named the risky is the action really with a small risk and we need to include in the 
next similar models more risky action which is more corresponding to real 
behavior of participant of market (for example overweighting of a  small subjective 
probabilities). By our opinion this can to have as a consequence the trajectories of 
average price of market more similar to reality.  The automaton    is not 
unique automaton which was considered in investigations of games of automata by 
Gelfand , Tzetlin and coworkers. There are also stochastic automata.  So we have 
large scope for using   different models of individual behavior of agents.  We have 
little hopes to successes of analytical investigation of our agent based model of 
closed market, because we have many singularities as consequence of our 
mechanisms of market interaction, but there are many hopes to investigation of 
corresponding markets by computer experiment with new similar models. 
Our model is only partial reflection of the reality, because all markets are 
connected among themselves by many economical ties and informational canals. 
Not one from partners of stock market never do decision making about selling or 
about purchase without taking in account the common for all economy of the 
fundamental value, of course. All participants of our market have the same 
mechanism of choice of behavior and interaction. That is reason of uniform 
distribution of profit and its gives to the competition on this market   a rather 
conditional character.  
This research is only some advance in investigation of one example of self 
adjusting system may be. Really explanation of phenomenons which relates to  
closed one commodity market tis not enough for understanding many 
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phenomenons of  financial market such as herd behavior of participants for 
example. 
But we hope that in the movement prolonging the chain from one model to more 
complicated  model we shall  overcome at least the part of these imperfections. 
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